Regulating the Regulators Too

Cultural rights call into question what our profession takes for granted, and this questioning unsettles even the people who chose to be trained. Training courses and support programmes run in their name need instituted spaces where the process itself, facilitation included, can be put up for discussion.

10 September 2026 Benoît Labourdette  14 min

In a training course or a support programme on cultural rights, each person present is asked to re-examine assumptions that are part of their professional identity, and this re-examination produces resistance, projections onto the person facilitating, and unease that people often have nowhere to voice. I try here to understand this process and why it is normal, and then, drawing on the institutional psychotherapy of François Tosquelles and Jean Oury and on the council of institutional pedagogy, I propose a way of instituting regulation while a training session is actually under way, one that includes the people who facilitate. Transmitting cultural rights and the way one goes about it are one and the same question.

A long history for a small sentence

Cultural rights do not date from the Fribourg Declaration. Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states that everyone is entitled to realization of the “economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity”, and Article 27 that everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community. In 1966, this right appears in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a treaty which, unlike the Declaration, is binding on the States that ratify it. In 1982, the UNESCO world conference held in Mexico City adopted a broad definition of culture, as the whole set of features that characterize a society or social group, modes of life and value systems included, and no longer only the arts and letters. With this definition, each person is recognized as the bearer of a culture before being the audience of an institution.

In 1991, the Interdisciplinary Institute for Ethics and Human Rights at the University of Fribourg, coordinated by the philosopher Patrice Meyer-Bisch, organized a conference whose title states the problem: “Les droits culturels, une catégorie sous-développée de droits de l’homme” (cultural rights, an underdeveloped category of human rights). The international working group that grew out of it, the Fribourg Group, worked for sixteen years before publishing, in 2007, the Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights. In the meantime, UNESCO adopted in 2001 the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, in which cultural rights are recognized as an integral part of human rights, then in 2005 the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, and the Council of Europe opened for signature in Faro, the same year, a convention in which everyone’s right to cultural heritage is recognized. In 2009, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights published its General Comment No. 21, in which it sets out the obligations of States so that everyone can take part in cultural life. In France, the NOTRe Act of 2015 and then the LCAP Act of 2016 wrote respect for cultural rights into the missions of local authorities and of the State. In a working paper prepared for that Committee in 2008, Meyer-Bisch marvels that there should be “so much at stake in such a small sentence”, that of Article 15 of the Covenant, and notes that sixty years of texts have not been enough:

“[…] the coherence of cultural rights is not sufficient: their definition is fragmented, they are torn between civil and political rights and economic and social rights, and still often reduced to the rights of minorities. The Fribourg Declaration brings together and makes explicit the rights already recognized, in a scattered way, in numerous instruments.”

Patrice Meyer-Bisch, “Le droit de participer à la vie culturelle. Contenu et importance pour la réalisation de tous les droits de l’homme”, working paper for the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2008.

If it took sixty years to begin writing these rights down, it is, in my view, because they touch on what is most intimate in each person, and on the places that institutions hand out. Rights are only proclaimed where they are not respected. The work that cultural rights demand consists in making visible relations of domination that are held to be normal in the ordinary workings of the sector; I described in the article Domination at the Heart of Culture how this domination is exercised in the very name of culture.

The assumptions that cultural rights call into question

In the cultural field, these assumptions are the ones we were taught and with which we trained: that some works are worth more than others, that some people have access to culture and others have to be brought to it, that there are professionals who know and audiences who receive. The sector has been built on these assumptions since the creation of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1959, in its training courses, its vocabulary and its institutions, and people sincerely committed to the common good have carried them. Cultural rights nevertheless ask us to re-examine them one by one, because a hierarchy of persons is hidden there beneath a hierarchy of works.

Jean Oury, psychiatrist and founder of the La Borde clinic, describes, in a 1993 text in which he sets out the concepts of institutional psychotherapy, a form of alienation that I recognize in our field:

“As for ‘paternalism’, it is the most common form of alienation in contemporary society, which presents itself in the form of disguised contempt, pity, false charity, overprotection […].”

Jean Oury, “Psychanalyse, psychiatrie et psychothérapie institutionnelles”, 1993, reprinted in the journal VST, 2007.

He is writing about the care of people with psychosis, but the description holds for part of the history of cultural democratization: bringing people towards what is good for them, with benevolence, without asking them what they know or what they already do. Cultural rights ask professionals to recognize this paternalism in their own gestures, and one can understand that this is not comfortable.

When the job is part of who you are

My convictions about my job are part of who I am. A mediator who has spent fifteen years “bringing remote audiences to culture” does not hold that phrase to be one opinion among others: it is the meaning of their days, the reason they chose this work, what they answer when asked what they do for a living. When, in a training course on cultural rights, they are shown, as Anne Aubry of Réseau culture 21 does, that this phrase separates, without their having wanted it, those who are supposedly beings of culture from those who supposedly are not yet, they receive the idea as a challenge to their very person. They begin by not wanting to hear it. They look for arguments to justify what they thought before; they find that the person speaking is exaggerating, does not know their field, that it is all theory. This reaction is normal. Everyone protects what constitutes them when they feel attacked, and protects it all the more forcefully when the attack comes from where they did not expect it. I described in the article On Being a Good Enough Professional the vertigo of lost meaning that this discovery brings on; it takes time, and support, to come out of it.

I have seen this reaction many times, and not only among mediators. When I train artists to work in the social field, I offer them projects in which they do not pass on their technique, where the point is not to teach printmaking or video to the people they work with, but to create with them from what they already know. I recounted in the article Working with Artists in the Social Field how much this proposal unsettles them: these artists may confuse who they are with what they know how to do, and asking them not to teach touches their identity. I am not immune to it. I have myself created festivals with prize lists, and each time I encountered the suffering of those who lose, without giving up the ranking for all that. I had to see, as a member of a jury, the last prize experienced as a humiliation by the young people who received it, for us to propose thematic prizes instead, which recognize each film for a quality of its own; I told this story in the article Filme Tout Court : Account of a First Collective Experience in Villetaneuse. And when I facilitated an awareness day for the team of a production office, which I recounted in the article Transmitting cultural rights : a question of coherence, the participants began, in the afternoon, to talk about themselves, far from my minute-by-minute programme; I had to give up what I had prepared, that is, part of what reassured me in my place as trainer.

Taking oneself for one’s status

This unsettling takes place in an institution, a theatre, a media library, a cultural department, a festival, where each person has received a place, a status, a function, and has learned to identify with them. François Tosquelles and Jean Oury speak of double alienation in order to think together psychic alienation, which comes from each person’s history, and social alienation, which comes from the institutional environment. Oury writes in the same 1993 text:

“Every responsible person must maintain the distance between ‘status’, ‘role’ and ‘function’… That the nurse should take himself for ‘the nurse’, the cook for ‘the cook’, and the doctor for ‘the doctor’ is, unfortunately, a worldwide disease! Everyone tends to identify with their ‘status’.”

Jean Oury, “Psychanalyse, psychiatrie et psychothérapie institutionnelles”, 1993, reprinted in the journal VST, 2007.

Oury does not say that places are bad. A collective holds together because people occupy distinct and complementary roles in it: someone programmes, someone welcomes, someone runs the technical side, someone keeps the accounts, and it is this complementarity that allows a theatre to open its doors in the evening. What Oury calls a disease is identification with status, that is, the moment when the place stops being a function I perform for the collective and becomes what I am. And in an ordinary institution, this comes about because the place is given from above, with its job description, its remit and its hierarchy, without anyone asking the person what they wish to do in it. When the place is imposed, the person holds back. They do not bring to the collective what else they could have brought, they experience the slightest step aside as a transgression, and when they feel cramped in it, they suffer a violence that nobody decided on, and that comes from the organization itself.

This is what institutional psychotherapy is for. When the institution is recreated together, as was done at Saint-Alban and then at La Borde by deciding together on each person’s role, the aim is not to abolish places; the aim is for each person to understand what their place does for the others, and to be able to put something of themselves into it. When the institution is invented rather than received, each person’s desire has its share in it, and the collective is enriched by the individualities that make it up instead of levelling them. A living institution is one where roles are solid because people have chosen them, and where they can move because people have moved. Cultural rights, in asking that each person be recognized as a subject of culture, ask this too of the people who keep cultural organizations alive, and that is why, if a support programme sought only to convince individuals, without touching the way places are distributed, it would miss the essential.

The transference onto the person who facilitates

The people who take part in a training course or a support programme have, most of the time, chosen to come. They expect the person facilitating to enrich them. But if what that person brings unsettles them too much, if it damages the image they have of themselves, they defend themselves, and they need a target. The person facilitating is the natural target, because they occupy a de facto position of authority, and because they are the one who set in motion what disturbs. Psychoanalysts call transference this depositing, onto a person, of affects and expectations that come from elsewhere, from each person’s history, from the authority figures they have known, from the wounds they carry; and they call countertransference the reactions that this deposit provokes in the person who receives it: the urge to convince, the guilt in the face of discontent, the need to be loved by the group. I developed these two notions, with the psychoanalyst Mireille Cifali, in the same article, “On Being a Good Enough Professional”. Through countertransference, we tend to interpret a group’s silence as agreement, or its irritation as an injustice. All of this is normal. Where there is no transference at all, it is likely that nothing has moved.

What remains is to know what to do with this transference. One can rely on the sensitivity of the person facilitating alone, who will sense, or will not sense, that something is wrong. I argue for another path, which I learned to formulate in institutional psychotherapy: giving it an instituted place and time, where the whole group, facilitation included, can look at what is happening while it is happening.

Setting a framework is not enough

In the article The framework that authorizes, I argued for a framework that makes expression possible instead of merely containing it. The framework I am talking about does not consist of prohibitions and sanctions. I recalled in that same article, drawing on Olivier Houdé’s work on inhibition, that fear blocks learning: when a person feels threatened, even symbolically, their brain disarms the functions they would need in order to think, learn and express themselves. A framework made of threats therefore produces the opposite of what is expected of it. The framework that authorizes is set beforehand, in the preparation and in the first minutes of a meeting, when the intentions, the rules and the conditions of participation are stated, and it serves to let people know that what they are about to dare will not be punished by rejection.

Yet a living collective situation always produces the unforeseen, and all the more so when it touches on people’s identity: an instruction understood differently from how it was meant, an exercise that puts someone in difficulty, a word that wounds without anyone having intended it, a fundamental disagreement that cannot find its form. I call regulation whatever makes it possible to adjust the process while it is taking place, on the basis of what people are actually experiencing. A framework without regulation risks becoming an alibi, since one can always reply to a person in difficulty that the rules had been announced. And when regulation has neither a place nor a time set aside for it, it rests entirely on individual courage: one has to dare to interrupt, to raise one’s hand, to contradict the facilitator publicly. This courage does not cost everyone the same, depending on their position and their ease in speaking in public. Reserving regulation, in practice, for the most self-assured contradicts the cultural rights in whose name the meeting was organized. Hence my proposal: regulation must be instituted, that is, given places, times and forms planned in advance, and it must be able to bear on everyone, including the people who facilitate.

Caring for the institution so that people are respected in it

Institutional psychotherapy was born of a movement of the same order as that of cultural rights. I recounted in the article The One Who Makes Nothing the arrival of François Tosquelles at the Saint-Alban hospital in 1940, carrying in his luggage the book by Hermann Simon from which he drew the idea that the hospital must be treated before the people are, and in the article Instituting oneself in one’s rights the way in which, at La Borde, carers and cared-for decide together on each person’s role. Tosquelles’s starting point fits in one sentence, which can be found on the back cover of “Dialogues à La Borde” by Jean Oury and Danielle Roulot:

“Without recognition of the human value of madness, it is man himself who disappears.”

François Tosquelles, quoted on the back cover of Jean Oury and Danielle Roulot, “Dialogues à La Borde”, 2008.

To recognize the patient as a subject, the entire institution had to be transformed, its hierarchies, the place of the doctors, the circulation of speech, because everything in the asylum’s organization served to confine. Cultural rights ask the same of cultural professionals: to recognize the human value of each person’s culture, and to transform whatever in the institution needs transforming for that recognition to be possible. In both cases, one cannot hope that the institution will remain intact, nor ask the people who keep it alive to change on their own.

In his Sainte-Anne seminar devoted to the collective, Oury says:

“What matters most is that there should be, there, in that place, a space of saying, that there should be a possibility of expressing oneself, even if one says nothing; that there should be something there, a way of being at ease.”

Jean Oury, “Le Collectif. Le séminaire de Sainte-Anne”, 1986.

The space of saying, as I understand it, means knowing, when one is there, that one could say what one has to say, even if one says nothing. In “Dialogues à La Borde”, the back cover tells us, Jean Oury and Danielle Roulot plead for this space to be maintained, against a managerial logic of which nobody knows any longer who is steering it. It is this space that is missing, in my view, from most of our training courses and professional meetings. Their most common form is the slide presentation, where everything is planned in advance, slide after slide, and where the person speaking moves through a sequence that nothing the people present might say can alter. Everything in it is decided before people arrive, and so we deny ourselves, before even starting, the chance of being enriched by those who are present. For something to be said during the meeting, the why has to have been put back before the how: knowing what we are looking for together, and building with the people present the way to get there.

The Fribourg Declaration contains a distinction that it does not underline. Among the eight rights set out in it, which I proposed using as an analytical grid in the article Analyze your project using the Fribourg Declaration, two resemble each other and do not mean the same thing: the right to participate in cultural life (Article 5) and the right to participate in the development of cultural cooperation (Article 8). To participate, as I understand it, is to take part in something that already exists; to cooperate, literally to work together, is to build the thing itself with others. In a training course where one participates, one can ask questions about what has been planned; in a training course where one cooperates, the people present build the process itself with us, and that is how their culture, their knowledge and their ways of doing things enter into what we make together.

The fundamental question that everyone must ask themselves in an institution, Jean Oury kept repeating, in his Sainte-Anne seminars as in the one he held every week at La Borde, is “Qu’est-ce que je fous là ?” (what the hell am I doing here?). Pierre Delion, a child psychiatrist who was his friend, says this about it:

“It really was one of his great questions, which required, he said, an ‘absolute phenomenological reduction’. It is a question that looks like nothing – many found that it did not sound serious –, and yet it sets off an avalanche of concepts that it overdetermines…”

Pierre Delion, “Oury, donc”, 2022.

This question is addressed to patients and to participants alike, but first of all to carers, to trainers, to the people who hold the framework. To ask it of oneself is to refuse to take oneself for one’s status, and to accept that one’s own place can be discussed.

Fernand Oury’s council

The most precise tool for this work comes from school. Fernand Oury, Jean’s brother, a primary school teacher trained in Freinet techniques, and Aïda Vasquez, a psychologist, published in 1967 “Vers une pédagogie institutionnelle”, in which they describe the classroom as a micro-society that makes its own rules and can change them. Its central institution is the council: a regular meeting where the pupils and the teacher examine together the rules, the conflicts, the decisions and the responsibilities. The teacher takes part as a member, subject to the common rules, and their own decisions can be discussed there. Jacques Pain reports some of the aphorisms in which Fernand Oury summed up his craft:

“Say nothing that we have not done […]. Speech is not given, it is taken. Places, Limits, Laws: that is the possibility of Language and of education. Keep silent, the better to hear.”

Fernand Oury, quoted by Jacques Pain, “Fernand Oury et la pédagogie institutionnelle”.

The council is the instituted place where one can speak up, so that doing so does not depend on each person’s courage or status; and the places, the limits and the laws make this speaking up possible, because in order to speak one needs a framework solid enough to be able to oppose it. The two brothers did in fact work together: it was Jean who, at the Freinet congress of 1958, gave institutional pedagogy its name, by analogy with institutional psychotherapy.

A seminar, a training course, an artistic workshop are ephemeral institutions, and I think they deserve the same care as lasting ones. The council transposes to them with no difficulty of principle; it is the habit that is lacking.

Nobody regulates the people who facilitate

In the training courses and professional meetings of the cultural sector, we evaluate, but almost always afterwards. Participants fill in the satisfaction questionnaire when it is all over, and it is the organizer who reads it, not the group that lived through the situation. During the meeting, only the person facilitating has a say over how it unfolds, and nothing, in most set-ups, allows participants to work, there and then, on the transference of which the facilitator is the object.

I propose a situation recomposed from several that I have lived through or that have been reported to me. During a workshop, a facilitator proposes an exercise that involves the body, without specifying that everyone is free to take part or not. Several participants are ill at ease. Some comply, others step aside in silence, and nobody has planned a moment in the schedule when this unease could be voiced. These people will voice it weeks later, elsewhere, and in their accounts the whole workshop will have become suspect, and the person who ran it, the figure of everything that disturbed them. The problem is structural far more than moral. The facilitator may well have been attentive and kind; but nobody sees everything. Regulation therefore cannot remain a favour that the facilitator grants when they sense it is necessary, because it is their sensitivity that is failing at such moments. It must be an instituted right.

Instituting regulation without turning it into a tribunal

From institutional psychotherapy, from institutional pedagogy and from my own practice, I draw a few guidelines. I am not saying that this is how it must be done; these are ways of doing things that I have tested and that I propose:

  • Plan short, regular times devoted to the process itself. I announce them at the opening, and I distinguish them from the closing round: for example a quarter of an hour at midday where the question asked is not “are you satisfied” but “does anything need adjusting”. This is Fernand Oury’s council, scaled down to the length of a day.
  • Repeat, with each activity proposed, that everyone is free to take part or not. This permission wears off quickly if it has been given only once, and it is at the moment of the exercise, more than at the opening, that it is useful.
  • Diversify the channels of regulation. Add written forms, or small-group forms, to speaking in the full group, so that regulation does not depend on ease in speaking. I described in the article Activating collective intelligence with digital tools how a shared writing space allows those who would not otherwise speak up to contribute.
  • Say explicitly, as the person facilitating, that one submits to the rules one proposes. Say too that the adjustments requested may bear on one’s own way of doing things. This is the teacher’s place in Fernand Oury’s council, and it is what makes the rest credible.
  • Name the unsettling at the moment it appears. When a group resists, I say that this resistance is expected, that it shows we are touching on something important, and that people have the right to express it here; often it then becomes work, instead of becoming a hostile account after the event.

I have long practised a way of doing things that I call weaving. While a day is unfolding, I comment on what is happening as it happens: I say that we have just changed subject, that the room has gone quiet, that the last question changed the course of the discussion. And I say what I think people are feeling, making clear that it is a hypothesis: that this exercise may have seemed intrusive, that the questioning of a moment ago is perhaps still there, that a particular remark may have been heard as a reproach. I am often wrong on the detail, and it does not matter: people hear that what they are experiencing is being taken into account, including what they have not said. With each comment, I connect one moment to the previous one, one remark to another, an unease to what produced it, and this makes a weave in which everyone finds their thread again. A person unsettled by what they have just heard is no longer alone with their unease; they are part of a group where this unease has been named, where others have perhaps recognized it, and that is reassuring enough for the work to continue. Weaving means keeping alive the space of saying of which Jean Oury speaks through the voice of the person facilitating, without waiting for someone to have the courage to speak.

Part of regulation can only take place later, because some things can only be formulated after the event. Peer groups for the analysis of practice, heirs to the discussion groups in which the psychoanalyst Michael Balint brought together general practitioners in London in the 1950s, play this role of deferred regulation for the people who facilitate. In every case, the aim remains the same as that of Fernand Oury’s council, which decides and repairs but does not condemn. Through regulation, we seek adjustment rather than judgment, and we protect those who facilitate as much as those who take part.

Not pretending

Jean Oury writes, in the same 1993 text, about the activities that make up the life of a care institution:

“All these activities that make up institutional life must not belong to the category of ‘pretending’. The ethical position of the therapists therefore implies that they be responsible for the responsibility of others, including in moments of violence. Otherwise, one slides towards mere charity work.”

Jean Oury, “Psychanalyse, psychiatrie et psychothérapie institutionnelles”, 1993, reprinted in the journal VST, 2007.

When a training course is run in the name of cultural rights without any space being provided in it for discussing it, people are asked to take on trust what we claim to guarantee them, and we slide towards the charity work Oury speaks of. Instituting regulation means giving the group the means to check, in the situation itself, that the principles announced also apply to those who announce them.

Cultural projects change, because the people they are addressed to have new needs and new ways of doing things, which I discussed, with regard to teenagers and digital technology, in the article The place of teenagers in cultural life. When projects change, the way work is organized changes with them: the roles, the places, the ways of deciding, the institution itself. If the people who keep a cultural organization alive cannot reinvent their places, they will not be able to keep up with those for whom the organization exists. Learning, in a one-day training course, to put up for discussion the process and the place of the person who leads it, is to practise on a small scale what cultural rights ask for on a large one.

See also

In the section Cultural rights 42 publications

How to cite Benoît Labourdette, “Regulating the Regulators Too”, Benoît Labourdette production, 10 September 2026.
https://www.benoitlabourdette.com/les-ressources/les-droits-culturels/reguler-aussi-les-regulateurs?lang=en

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